INTRODUCTION
This short paper introduces the reader to the mutating military concept of hybrid warfare and one of its implementing methods, the use of law as a weapon. We aim to provide a current, comprehensive definition of the terms "hybrid warfare" and "lawfare". This submission focuses on the following areas: where law has been/is being used as a method of war, namely the Jus ad bellum, the jus in bello and the law of treaties in international relations.
HYBRID WARFARE
Hybrid warfare as a warfare concept is not new among those practising the art of war. However, contemporary events lead us to argue that today's hybrid warfare "has the potential to transform the strategic calculations of potential belligerents [it has become] increasingly sophisticated and deadly" (A Deep, 'Hybrid War: Old Concept, New Techniques', Small Wars Journal, March 2, 2015) .
The concept of hybrid warfare has been discussed by (mostly US) military writers since the beginning of the 21st century and its recognition as a theory in formal military doctrinal thinking is still not settled. Hybrid warfare may use elements from four existing methods and categories of full spectrum warfare, namely:
• conventional warfare;
• irregular warfare (such as terrorism and counterinsurgency);
• related asymmetric warfare (unconventional warfare such partisan warfare); and• compound warfare (where irregular forces are used simultaneously against an opponent while being employed by state actors to augment their otherwise conventional warfare approach).
Hybrid warfare builds on existing doctrinal elements and adds the following: The hybrid warfare concept recognises the existing and documented notion of hybrid threats as identified by NATO (cf NATO's Bi-Strategic Command Capstone Concept, 5000 FXX/0100/TT-0651/SER: NU0040, dated August 25, 2010: BI-SC Input for a new Capstone Concept for The Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Threats (MCCHT)). NATO's Bi-Strategic Command Capstone Concept describes these hybrid threats as "those posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and nonconventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives": (Hybrid Threats Description 1500/CPPCAM/FCR/10-270038 AND 5000 FXX/0100/TT-0651/SER: NU0040 dated August 25, 2010; BI-SC Input for a new Capstone Concept for the Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Threats (para 7) cited in S Bachmann, "Hybrid Threats, cyber warfare and NATO's comprehensive approach for countering 21st century threats -mapping the new frontier of global risk and security management", (2011) 88 Amicus Curiae 24).
Between 2011 and 2012, NATO drew up a specific threat catalogue, which identified security-specific risks beyond conventional warfare threats: nuclear proliferation; terrorism; cyber-crime and cyber-war; organised crime and its role in drugs, arms and human trafficking; migration; ethnic and religious conflicts; population conflicts due to resource scarcity; and globalisation. NATO recognised that such threats may amount to a concrete threat to the alliance or that NATO could be authorised by the United Nations, because of their capacity, to intervene. Recognising this NATO worked on a related global approach (comprehensive approach) in order to counter these risks. This approach envisaged involving state Russia uses security/military, political, legal, informational, technical and economic elements to feed its hybrid warfare activities. NATO during the 2014 Wales Summit adopted the readiness action plan (RAP) in order to respond to new threats. The RAP needs to be complemented with a proper hybrid warfare strategy and will be developed for the 2016 Warsaw Summit. The question is how NATO, primarily oriented to provide collective defence, will transform structures and procedures properly to respond to the challenges of hybrid warfare. Developing a long-term strategy gives advantage to the NATO allies vis-à-vis those using hybrid warfare, which is by definition a method applying short-term set tactics without a strategy aimed at causing its adherents sustainability problems in the long term. Among the means or methods used in hybrid warfare to achieve the intentions described above, we can find "lawfare", which is no less than the use of law as a means of war, ie as a (non-lethal) weapon.
LAWFARE AS A COMPONENT OF HYBRID WARFARE
Lawfare is using law as a weapon with the goal of manipulating the law by changing legal paradigms. It appears to have been first defined by Dunlap back in 2001, who refined his previous definition in 2007 to state that lawfare "is the strategy of using -or misusing -law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective"(C Dunlap "Lawfare Today: a Perspective", Yale Journal of International Affairs (Winter 2008), 146).
In the case of the conflict brought by Russia into Ukraine, lawfare plays a relevant part and has its roots in an undefined situation, ie the lack of definition of the conflict (whether it constitutes international armed conflict, non-international armed conflict, or civil unrest). This ambiguous situation creates confusion as to the source or paradigm of applicable law and any consequent action to identify and assign legal responsibilities and demand accountability. Consequently, the following can be argued with respect to the limits imposed by international law in regular conflicts. Jus ad bellum, where Russia denies being an active agent in the conflict, law is evaded and misused; (see S Reeves, R Barnsby, "The New Griffin of War. On this note, it can be said that "modern" hybrid warfare does not only present challenges to international peace and security, but also undermines current legal frameworks by questioning the public international law rules of the game. The result is a rhetorical use of international law and judicial processes, which may turn international humanitarian law and human rights law into inapplicable law, and create the idea that abiding by the law may also become inconsistent with the perceived interests of the warring parties.
The question of the 1994 so-called Budapest Memorandum illustrates lawfare. It was signed by Ukraine, United States, Russia and United Kingdom, and the parties agreed to "respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine" and "refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine:" (United Nations Document A/49/765, S/1994/1399, December 19, 1994, <www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-armscontrol-and-disarmament/budapest-memorandums-securityassurances-1994/p32484>, August 12, 2015.) However, after Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 (and subsequent "occupation" of Eastern Ukraine), the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued in March 2015 that: This statement can be seen as a deliberate attempt at misinformation regarding the scope of existing treaty obligations in order to confuse public opinion in the West. Such malicious use of lawfare to "negate" the validity of treaties and void the inherent principle of international law's pacta sunt servanda qualifies as treaty abuse, as a special case of the concept of abus de droit (see M Byers, "Abuse of Rights: an Old Principle, a New Age", (2002) McGill Law Journal, vol 47, 397-404.) This concept of "abuse of right" relates to situations where states or international organisations (or other subjects of international law) as parties to an international agreement interpret and apply its provisions depending on the particular circumstances in order to benefit from such a deviation. In this context, the party not applying the agreement can claim circumstantially that the other party exercises the agreement's provisions abusively. President Putin's further declaration that Russia had intervened, under international law, "to defend the rights of Russian-speakers living abroad" highlights Russia's consequent use of lawfare to aid its overall goals. We have highlighted two instances of Russia's abuse of law and argue that any Russian claim to have the right to intervene in Ukraine under international law must prove "the urgent humanitarian catastrophe it seeks to avert and why there is no alternative to its action … [i]t should not act by stealth and revert to the 'big lie', denying that its forces are engaged, denying that its missile units shot down Malaysian airliner MH17, and pretending to be the peacemaker" (See eg E Buckley, I Pascu , "NATO's Article 5 and Russian Hybrid Warfare" (March 17, 2015 ), <www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/nato-s-article-5-and-russian-hybrid-warfare>, August 17, 2015 .
This shows that the deliberate interpretation of international agreements in a circumstantial manner amounts to lack of good faith, amounting to being an abus de droit and potentially giving rise to state responsibility, ('1075th Meeting', Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1970 , vol 1 (New York: United Nations, 1971 New York, December 9, 2011 , <legal.un.org/avl/ha/ario/ario. html>, August 19, 2015 in the case of Russia (or other states) aiding and abetting non-state actors.
Voyger in support of the above argues that "[w]hile Russia is not in control of the entire international legal system, and thus not fully capable of changing it 'de jure', it is definitely trying to erode its fundamental principles 'de facto'" -see M Voyger, "Russia's Use of 'Legal' as an Element of its Comprehensive Warfare Strategy", NATO LANDCOM, Izmir Review (2015) 1 (not yet published -onn file with the authors).
It remains to be seen to what extent Voyger's prediction will come true.
CONCLUSION
The main conclusion of this paper is that the inherent complexity, ambiguity and the attributable character of hybrid warfare creates not only new security but also legal challenges for those opponents who adhere to international law within good faith and the commonly agreed frameworks established under and governed by the principles of the rule of law. Lawabiding state actors are currently being confronted by hybrid warfare initiatives which deprive them of the opportunity to resolve issues through timely and appropriate political decisionmaking processes. Such law-abiding actors are constrained by compliance with the rule of law and public morality, which make them operate under the aegis of democratic procedures and be subject to court review and public opinion scrutiny.
A chaotic legal environment where the rules of the game have been blown out by those using hybrid warfare requires law-abiding states and others to act by using counter tactics containing a comprehensive legal approach and broad legal interoperability, which should include the use of affirmative lawfare in all imaginable aspects of law to support the fight against hybrid warfare. The article is written in a personal capacity by both authors and does not represent the views of their employers or the organisations they belong to.
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